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Huddled at the trench's lip, eyes fixed upon the desolate 
moonscape beyond, anxious soldiers clutched their bayonet-fixed Nebil 
rifles as their hearts hammered against their chests. As the whistle's Harpie-
like cry pierced the air, these troops charged across No Man's Land while 
German shells erupted all around them in a volcanic symphony.  The 
enemy saw the men's French uniforms and dark skin, and believed they 
faced another company of France's feared West African shock troops.  
However, these soldiers were not African, nor were they French.  These 
were African-American soldiers of the US Army's 93rd Infantry Division.  
Placed under the command of the French army in 1918 while still 
nominally a part of the AEF, these African-American troops had the 
unique experience of serving in two different armies from two different 
nations. Unlike their sister division, the 92nd, the 93rd tasted what they 
believed to be the fruits of equality long denied them in America. 
Moreover, the legacy of these African-American soldiers reveals far more 
than racial perspectives held by Americans, but also those of the French, 
especially when one considers their use of African colonials. Through the 
lenses of US black soldiers' wartime trials, the employment of black troops 
in both armies, as well as US and French racial perceptions, one beholds 
racism's sinister sneer upon the visages of both American and French 
societies. 
In the spring of 1917, the Great War's churning vortex pulled the 
United States into the abyss of battle. The War Department called for a 
massive army, the likes of which had not been seen since the Civil War, 
and hundreds of thousands of men either volunteered or were drafted into 
the armed forces. Training camps sprang up all over the country, National 
Guard units frantically tried to fill their troop strength quotas, and the War 
Department applied itself to the daunting task of organizing this planned 
one-million-man army into divisions. In a startling deviation from the 
Army’s racial past, two of these combat divisions were specifically 
designated as all African-American divisions. In 1898, the US Army listed 
2,500 active-duty officers, only one of whom was an African-American, as 
well as a mere four all-black regiments. By World War I, two of these 
regiments were stationed in the western United States, one in Hawaii, and 
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one more in the Philippines, and had the War Department had its way, no 
African-American boot would have ever set foot on European soil. As 
historian Frank E. Roberts expresses in his work The American Foreign 
Legion, the War Department initially omitted any organized African-
American units from their war plans, citing a lack of confidence in black 
men's ability to endure war's harsh realities. Unfazed, African-American 
community leaders and lobbyists applied tremendous pressure, eventually 
forcing the Army to execute an about-face on the matter.  Originally 
favoring the raising of all-black volunteer pioneer (frontline labor troops) 
regiments, in the end, the US government finally acquiesced to the creation 
of the 92nd "Buffalo Soldiers" Division and the four regiments of the 
never-completed 93rd. So began their great war for democracy.1 
 The war catapulted men from every corner of America, black and white, 
from their homes to faraway training camps in places upon which they had 
never before laid eyes. While many cantonments were located in the same 
region as the volunteers or draftees, many more required the green recruits 
to travel great distances. The trainees of the 15th New York, 8th Illinois, 
and the draftees of the future 371st Regiment of the 93rd division would 
all face this swirling upheaval as they uprooted to camps across the 
country.  For the 92nd Division, their draftees occupied training centers 
stretching from Long Island, New York, to Camp Funston, Kansas. Still, 
despite the fact that these training assignments sent African-American men 
to unfamiliar places, a familiar and insidious entity followed them wherever 
they traveled. W. Allison Sweeney, in his 1919 book History of the American 
Negro in the Great World War, succinctly described this spectre when he 
declared that "the old feeling of intolerance; the disposition to treat the 
Negro unfairly, was yet abroad in the land." In fact, such intolerance 
embedded itself in the very deployment orders that spirited so many young 
African-Americans across such a vast territory. At the war’s onset, the War 
Department officially mandated that black troops must comprise a 
minority of every base's population, therefore US Army cantonments had 
to maintain a 2:1 ratio that ensured twice as many whites were on base as 
blacks. Not surprisingly, such dispersions and ratios made any sort of 
cohesive training between all-black units extremely difficult; a handicap 
that would prove crippling for some units overseas. Furthermore, War 
Department bureaucrats anxiously realized that the official policy of 
                                                            
1 Stephen L. Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters: The African-American 369th Infantry in World War I 
(Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2003), 12; Frank E. Roberts, The American Foreign Legion: 
Black Soldiers of the 93rd in World War I (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 27. 
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sending trainees to local training camps would violate the ratio-order by 
creating a large black population on southern bases, therefore, most black 
units were deployed to segregated northern camps so as to avoid fanning 
racist fires in the South. Indeed, for the men of the 92nd, and until they 
joined French forces the 93rd, Jim Crow's menacing glare bore down on 
the men's olive drab backs.2 
Segregation's heavy hand kept a tight grip upon the Army's far-
flung bases; in the North, and especially in the South. In the North, de facto 
segregation stood as the accepted norm in race relations, but in the South, 
long-standing prejudices gave rise to the de jure Jim Crow laws that 
dominated and repressed African-American life throughout the region. 
For green northern soldiers like Private Bruce G. Wright, their first 
battlefield was not in muddy European trenches, but in southern towns 
and cantonments.   
Wright enlisted in the Massachusetts National Guard on June 15, 
1917, responding to his country's call with the same patriotic pride that 
swelled the chest of men both black and white. Despite the racial tensions, 
many men like Wright sought to take up the rifle in 1917 and join the 
crusade against Prussian militarism. One African-American newspaper 
entitled The Age captured this sentiment when it declared, "It does not 
mean that he should forget his just causes for complaint. It means that 
guided by hard, common sense and remembering all that this country justly 
owes him, the Negro will take up and perform the duty that falls to him."  
Reinforcing this belief, many African-Americans felt a burning desire to 
partake in "any war for the destruction of oligarchies which deny him the 
full-rounded citizenship he has won on every battlefield." However, such 
ardent patriotism slammed into the immovable object that was Southern 
racism.  As a soldier in the all-black Company L, 6th Massachusetts 
Infantry, Pvt. Wright and his comrades drew an unfortunate training 
assignment that shuttled them to Camp Greene in North Carolina.  In his 
diary, Wright observed that they were "the first colored soldiers seen south 
of the Mason-Dixon line in full equipment since 1865." Having been off 
the train for little more than an hour, the Massachusetts men clashed in 
their first engagement of the war. Referring to repeated fist fights between 
black and white troops, or as Wright called them, "the dirty crackers," it 
                                                            
2 Robert H. Ferrell, Unjustly Dishonored (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011), 4; 
W. Allison Sweeney, History of the American Negro in the Great World War (New York: 
Johnson Reprint Corp., 1919), 73, 92; Peter N. Nelson, A More Unbending Battle: The 
Harlem Hellfighters' Struggle for Freedom in World War I and Equality at Home (New York: Basic 
Civitas, 2009), 148. 
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was at Camp Greene that Pvt. Wright believed "the war began right then 
for us," and just like the 6th Massachusetts, the New York regiment soon 
felt Jim Crow's harsh sting as well.3 
Having been denied by the Army for inclusion into the 42nd 
"Rainbow" Division because "black is not a color of the rainbow," the 15th 
New York arrived for training at Camp Wadsworth outside the town of 
Spartanburg, South Carolina. Ominously, before the New Yorkers ever 
saw the trains that would carry them southward, South Carolinians were 
howling with indignation at the prospect of black troops in their state. 
Congressman Sam Nicholls, SC, prophesied on the House floor that 
armed black and white troops would trigger open war in the United States. 
In a strange echo of Private Wright's observations, Southern opponents 
pointed out that the last time black troops marched in the South was in 
the Civil War, specifically referencing the Union Army's all-black 54th 
Massachusetts Regiment's blood-drenched 1863 battle against 
Confederate forces at Fort Wagner, South Carolina, as evidence as to what 
would happen should blacks and whites cross paths in a Southern 
cantonment. So rabid was Southern hostility to the notion of African-
American soldiers that the Conscription Act of 1917 became the center of 
a political maelstrom as "bitter opposition which developed in its greatest 
intensity among the Southern senators and representatives" vainly aimed 
to derail the bill's passage. Adding fuel to the fire, many Southerners 
throughout the region maintained that black soldiers were traitors hell-
bent upon fomenting an armed uprising at the behest of German 
provocateurs. As America's war machine gained steam, the racial stress 
fractures began to buckle.4 
Just like Pvt. Wright, many New York soldiers found themselves 
battling their white countrymen before they ever saw a German, especially 
on guard duty. Often times, the African-American soldiers were purposely 
tasked with the mundane duty of guarding construction sites on base, 
which just as often resulted in knock-down scrapes between guards and 
white civilian construction workers who took offense at being searched by 
black soldiers. Historian Stephen Harris makes a compelling point by 
stating the Fifteenth's New York origins and skin color made them a 
                                                            
3 Tracy Lorvette Spencer, James E. Spencer, Jr., and Bruce G. Wright, "World War I as I 
Saw It: The Memoir of an African-American Soldier," Massachusetts Historical Review 9 
(2007): 144; Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 82-83; Emmett J. Scott, "The Participation of 
Negroes in World War I," Journal of Negro Education 12, no. 3 (Summer 1943): 289. 
4 Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 98, 114-117; Sweeney, History of the American Negro in the Great 
World War, 81.  
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convenient target for rabid white supremacists. To illustrate this point, 
Harris channels Spartanburg mayor John Floyd's declaration that 
Southerners were hardly threatened by black southern soldiers because "we 
understand them, and they understand us." It was northern blacks and 
their ideas of racial equality that prompted Floyd to complain that, "This 
thing is like waving a red flag in the face of a bull, something that can't be 
done without trouble." And trouble there was, sometimes to the point of 
inciting an intra-army civil war.5  
Etched into his diary's pages, Pvt. Wright unequivocally labels his 
time at Camp Greene as the "war on crackers." This war raged well beyond 
Camp Greene's confines, as was the case at Camp Mills in New York. After 
a brief two-week stay marked by a constant barrage of race-related 
disturbances in South Carolina, the 15th New York received orders to 
return to their native state and conclude their training at the 
aforementioned Camp Mills. As fate would have it, though, some of 
Alabama's most irascible racists would too. The lineal heirs to the Army of 
Northern Virginia's 4th Alabama Infantry Regiment, the 167th Infantry 
Regiment's battle standards bore bullet holes from some of the Civil War's 
fiercest combat, from First Manassas, Sharpsburg (Antietam), Gettysburg, 
Chickamauga, to the banner's furling at Appomattox in 1865.  Although 
the Civil War's guns had lain silent for 52 years, the embers that sparked 
that war still burned brightly in the Alabamians' hearts as they traveled 
northwards on a collision course with the Fifteenth. In fact, the regiment 
had such a ferocious racist reputation that General Joseph Wheeler, a 
former Confederate cavalry commander, abandoned the regiment to 
stateside service in 1898, believing them to lack any soldierly discipline, 
thus rendering them unfit to fight in Cuba. As historian Stephen L. Harris 
conveys in his chronicle of the 369th Infantry, these Alabamians frequently 
engaged in heated fist fights with black troops at Mills, especially the 15th 
New York, while employing intimidation tactics and hurling foul racial 
invectives whenever the opportunity arose.  Brazenly attempting to 
institute Southern norms on Northern soil, the Alabama troops haughtily 
erected signposts throughout the encampment delineating which side was 
reserved for whites and which side was for "colored." Such actions 
reflected the Alabamians' condescending amazement at white New 
                                                            
5 Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 115-116, 118-119. 
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Yorkers tolerating "uppity blacks," which in turn led to an incident that 
nearly resulted in a fever-pitched battle on base.6 
In late 1917, not long before the 15th New York received orders 
to embark for France where they would become the famed 369th Infantry, 
rumors swirled around the camp that the 167th Infantry planned to attack 
the black troopers in their barracks as they slept. Arming themselves with 
rifles and sidearms, the restless New York soldiers patrolled their barracks 
all night, and at one point, sentries crossed paths with 167th officers. 
Expecting the tension to erupt into a bloody cataclysm, the sentries quickly 
realized that these officers were conducting a patrol of their own, as they 
were "rounding up the ringleaders" responsible for hatching the insidious 
scheme. Luckily for all involved, no assault ever materialized, and by 
October 27, 1917, the Army had cut the Fifteenth's orders to sail for 
France. Still, such prejudices ran deep among Southern soldiers, and this 
would not be the last time this regiment, and others, would face such 
threats from their own countrymen. In a letter to a friend back home, one 
Southern doughboy in France could no longer contain his lamentations: 
"It certainly gets a Southerner's goat to see how the races mix up on this 
side."  After recounting several instances of racial interactions, the young 
soldier warned that the situation "will be worse" when the African-
American troops "and Southern soldiers get together over here."  So it did, 
as the New Yorkers landed in France only to later come under attack from 
white troops. Many black veterans from the 369th recalled that while the 
regiment bivouacked with US Marines, the Marines not only continued the 
same racist barrage experienced stateside, but even went so far as to 
murder several black soldiers. Taking matters into their own hands once 
again, the soldiers organized "vampire patrols" that prowled the barracks 
in search of terrorizing Marines hell-bent on wreaking havoc.  Armed and 
angry, the future "Hellfighters from Harlem" clashed with their roving foes 
and "exacted eye-for-an-eye." Faced with such spirited opposition, the 
murderous raids soon ceased, and once more, the New York regiment 
found itself on the move, this time to the French Army for combat service. 
Although race hatred physically manifested itself in these cases, there 
remained a plethora of ways that this elusive enemy reared its head, 
especially when the Army confronted the issue of advancing African-
American officers.7     
                                                            
6 Spencer, Spencer, and Wright, "World War I as I Saw It," 144; Roberts, The American 
Foreign Legion, 17; Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 109-112.   
7 Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 134-136, 160; "French Democracy Upsets Southern 
Newspaper Writer," The Washington Bee, January 19, 1918. 
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Echoing Mayor Floyd's cries, Colonel Herschel Tupes of the 93rd's 
372nd Regiment ardently declared that, "racial distinctions which are 
recognized in civilian life naturally continue to be recognized in military 
life." According to Tupes, these "racial distinctions" included stymying any 
advancement for black officers, a policy practiced not only in the 372nd 
Regiment, but throughout the US and French armies. The principal 
weapon employed to effect this policy lay in the "efficiency board," which 
sought to eliminate incompetent and ineffective officers from command 
positions, and often times, these officers were black.  Still, Tupes's quest 
was hardly a new one in the US Army, especially since many officers shared 
his views. In 1914, 14 Officer Training Schools operated in the Army, and 
not one admitted African-American candidates. Also, one uncovers the US 
Army's prevailing perception of African-American officers in the 
comments of Major General Alexander Hay, the 92nd Division's 184th 
Brigade's commander. Like so many officers of his era, Hay railed against 
African-Americans' supposedly stunted intellectual abilities, which he 
believed were directly linked to their racial heritage. According to Hay's 
rigid racism, not only did this prove white supremacy over the African race, 
but also reflected the rampant laziness and stupidity that made black 
Americans fit to command only the most menial of labor or pioneer units, 
and even then their competence and reliability remained highly suspect.  
Such attitudes died hard despite the reality, as evidenced by the 370th 
Infantry's composition. Among its troops were former draftsmen, 
chemists, mechanics, lawyers, doctors, and other college graduates from a 
variety of fields. In fact, these same troops left a profound impression 
upon Houston's white citizenry in the wake of the Camp Logan, Texas, 
race riots with their discipline and drill precision. Nevertheless, despite 
contrary evidence, the Army and War Department persisted in its 
institutionalized racism.8 
Adopting the War College's Personnel Re-organization, the 92nd 
Division significantly culled any opportunities black officers might have 
had for advancement through the ranks. Specifically, this plan decreed that 
divisional headquarters staff, brigade commander's aides, adjutants, 
captains of engineering and artillery billets, as well as supply officer and 
HQ company commander positions would be closed to black applicants. 
While severely limiting the number of positions available to black officers, 
                                                            
8 Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in 
World War I (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), 128; Nelson, A More Unbending 
Battle, 149; Ferrell, Unjustly Dishonored, 93; Roberts, The American Foreign Legion, 21, 24. 
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the re-organization effort hid another career-stunting tactic. Because many 
of the forbidden billets required one to be a captain, this move virtually 
assured that for the duration of their service, African-American officers 
found themselves glued to the rank of captain, should they even make it 
to that grade. This plan, combined with the efficiency boards, dropped the 
percentage of black officers in the "Buffalo Soldiers" Division from 82% 
at the war's beginning to 58% by its end.  Those lieutenants and captains 
who remained found it exceedingly difficult to train themselves and their 
units to any degree of efficiency, since repeated labor assignments 
siphoned them away from their actual duties. All of these tactics reflected 
the widespread belief that blacks’ racial inferiority inhibited their ability to 
withstand the strain of command. So prevalent was this view that not even 
ordinary military courtesy was immune. When lower-ranking white officers 
came across any higher-ranking African-Americans, they often refused to 
salute, and in a humiliating reversal, some black officers were ordered to 
salute their white subordinates. However, as the Army's African-American 
regiments trickled across the Atlantic into France, a kaleidoscopic reality 
awaited them. While the hapless 92nd would remain in the American 
Expeditionary Force and endure more of the same, the 93rd's soldiers 
would fight shoulder-to-shoulder with the French, where race took on 
both similar and dissimilar roles that allowed it to stand apart from that 
experienced in the United States.9 
As the trickle of raw doughboys into France became a flood, AEF 
commander General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing sought to manage the 
mammoth task of constructing and employing a combat-effective force, 
while at the same time parrying incessant requests from Supreme Allied 
Commander Marshal Ferdinand Foch for US troops, especially African-
American soldiers, to fill the gaping holes in his armies after nearly four 
years of brutal combat. These requests flummoxed the general, especially 
after British Secretary of War Lord Alfred Milner expressly rejected the US 
92nd Infantry Division for a training assignment with the British 
Expeditionary Force, citing in an official letter to Pershing that "a good 
deal of administrative trouble would, I think, necessarily arise if the British 
Army had to undertake the training of a colored Division." Despite 
defending the "Buffalo Soldiers" as "American citizens" who have been 
organized into a combat division for use in France, and therefore he "shall 
not discriminate against these soldiers," General Pershing's views on the 
                                                            
9 Barbeau and Henri, The Unknown Soldier, 142, 146-148; Nelson, A More Unbending Battle, 
149. 
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use of African-American combat troops seemed rather murky. Even 
Pershing himself bore a lasting reminder of the prevalent racial views held 
by white society; views that saw African-American men as being fit only 
for manual labor, thus the reason for so many black stevedore companies 
during the war.10   
As a young officer, Pershing served with African-Americans in the 
segregated 10th Cavalry, a fact that contributed to his immortal moniker 
that historian Donald Smythe traced to its pejorative origins when 
Pershing served as a tactical instructor at West Point from 1897 to 1898. 
Known for suffocatingly strict discipline, Pershing clashed with many 
high-spirited cadets under his command who, upon finding out that he had 
served with black troops, combined the most vulgar appellation for an 
African-American with the nickname for John. As Smythe related, 
eventually "this became the more euphemistic 'Black Jack.'" Loath to 
reflect on this period of his life, the general later conceded that this name 
was born from his days as a West Point instructor. Nevertheless, Pershing 
stated in his 1931 memoir My Experience in the World War that despite 
holding "a favorable impression on my mind" of black soldiers dating back 
to his days with the Tenth, he immediately added that African-American 
troops could perform well under the leadership of white officers. This statement 
mirrored the same disdain for black troops' mental capabilities held by so 
many Army officers, especially after he claimed that black troops required 
too much training and attention, and therefore should be utilized outside 
the combat arms.  As Pershing once declared: "Strong backs.  Weak minds.  
Stevedores, not soldiers. That's all they were good for." In spite of his lack 
of understanding, Pershing seized upon this opportunity to, as the 369th's 
Colonel Charles Heywood described it, "pawn off” the 93rd's regiments to 
the French.11 
Although Pershing insisted that the 93rd's men "were anxious to 
serve with our armies," and that he made arrangements to have the rest of 
the division filled out, he unhesitatingly transferred the incomplete 93rd 
Division to the command of the French Fourth Army, where, in Pershing's 
words, "these regiments remained with the French to the end." By 1918, 
the French re-christened the New York guardsmen as the 369ème Régiment 
d'Infantrie U.S., or 369th U.S. Infantry Regiment, an appellation that 
                                                            
10 General John J. Pershing, My Experience in the World War 2 (New York: Frederick A. 
Stokes and Co., 1931), 45, 46. 
11 Donald Smythe, "Pershing at West Point, 1897-1898," New York History 48, no. 1 (Jan. 
1967): 48; Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 117; Roberts, The American Foreign 
Legion, 52; Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 157-58, 178.  
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irritated the New Yorkers since any regimental designation greater than 
200 referred to a draftee regiment, which they were not. In 1918, the 370th, 
371st, and Pvt. Wright's 372nd would all follow the 369th into the 
trenches, physically transforming into French soldiers as they traded in 
their US Army gear for French equipment. As Colonel Heywood 
observed, "Oh, officially we were still the 369th US Infantry, but to all 
intent and purposes we were français." On the exterior, it appeared that 
Frenchmen lacked the racial prejudices that shackled white Americans' 
views. However, by descending into the same trenches as the 93rd 
Division, the role of race and its true nature in the French and US armies 
during the Great War began to emerge.12 
When one scans the voluminous records handed down from 93rd 
Division veterans, one instantly recognizes their sincere belief that racism 
did not exist in the French army, since French civilians received these 
soldiers from a strange land with open arms and heart-felt gratitude. 
Emmett J. Scott, who served as Secretary of War Newton Baker's special 
liaison to the African-American community during the war, postulated in 
his 1943 article on African-American participation during World War I that 
the 93rd's assignment to the French army allowed for these African-
American troops to escape "the traditional prejudices, sneers, and insults 
of those officials of American military units who looked with disfavor 
upon the employment of Negroes as combat troops." Private Bruce 
Wright, whose Massachusetts Guard company fought alongside the 
French as the 372nd Infantry Regiment, commented in his diary that the 
French soldiers, or "frog soldiers," stood in amazement at how rapidly 
Wright and his comrades grasped the intricacies of advanced infantry and 
weapons training. The 369th US Regiment's experience closely resembled 
Wright's, as the New Yorkers would "eat, dance, sing, march, and fight" 
shoulder-to-shoulder with the French in what the 369th's Colonel 
Heywood described as "absolute accord." In fact, W. Allison Sweeney 
boldly declared in his book chronicling African-Americans' World War I 
service that "The French poilu had not been taught that the color of a man's 
skin made a difference." These perceptions unnerved many an officer in 
the AEF. Although these regiments fought with the French Army, they 
were still American, and therefore still nominally under the American 
Expeditionary Force's aegis. It appeared that the 93rd might have slipped 
                                                            
12 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 97; Roberts, The American Foreign Legion, 47-
48; Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 177, 179, 181. 
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Jim Crow's grasp, but an official AEF document delivered to the French 
would extend its grasp deep into the trenches.13  
Entitled "Secret Information Concerning Black American Troops" 
and delivered to the French command by the AEF Headquarters, this 
document sought to define and mold French relations with the 93rd's men 
by curtailing any opportunities for African-Americans to glimpse any sort 
of racial equality through the window of another culture. Its provisions 
proved especially draconian. Orbiting around the principle of qu'elles ne 
gâtent pas les negres, which translates to "do not indulge the blacks," French 
officers were not supposed to praise or encourage African-American 
troops serving with them in any way, nor were they to fraternize, engage 
in any non-military conversation, or even shake hands with the US soldiers.  
Furthermore, this "secret information" dictated that the French must 
recognize African-Americans' social/racial inferiority in the United States, 
as well as their poor mental capacity. Another glaring guideline mandated 
a strict segregation policy in order to neutralize any African-American 
threat to "mongrolize [sic] the white race." Anything less than full 
recognition of these precepts threatened to strike at the core of US national 
beliefs, thereby upsetting the social and racial order in America.  After the 
French Army Command received these rules of engagement, it wound up 
in the hands of Monsieur René Boisneuf, who presented the list to the 
French Chamber of Deputies. In a fierce spirit of liberté, égalité, fraternité, the 
Chamber roundly castigated the American document and proceeded to 
pass resolutions reaffirming France's undying commitment to human 
rights and freedom. Judging from this political display, and the 93rd's 
wartime recollections, one is led to conclude that the French in World War 
I were truly devoid of prejudice, especially when compared to their newly 
found American allies. However, more lies beneath the surface, for the 
fond memories that many African-American soldiers held fast were rooted 
not in egalitarianism, but in racism itself.14 
Although the First World War was declared a war to "make the 
world safe for democracy," one must not forget that the Wilson 
Administration coined this term as a means of defining how the war related 
to Americans. In actuality, World War I was waged by European nations 
with vast colonial empires. Both Britain and France drew heavily upon the 
tremendous manpower resources of these empires, and since France 
                                                            
13 Scott, "The Participation of Negroes in World War I," 291; Spencer, Spencer, and 
Wright, "World War I as I Saw It," 149; Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 179.  
14 Barbeau and Henri, The Unknown Soldiers, 114-15; Sweeney, History of the American Negro 
in the Great World War, 149.    
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possessed large swathes of northern and western African territory, it too 
dealt with the race issue just like the United States. Still, the role of race in 
the French Army and how it eventually connected to race relations 
between French and African-American troops serving in the trenches 
takes on a unique perspective that makes it both similar and different than 
racial perceptions in the United States. 
 Regarding its own colonial forces, France made special use of its 
African subjects, especially those from western Africa. These units, called 
tirailleurs, or "skirmishers," were comprised primarily of Algerians, 
Senegalese, Moroccans, and Sudanese, and boasted an extensive service 
record in the French Army by the time war broke out in 1914. Service in 
France's 19th-century colonial wars and the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War 
forced the French to grudgingly acknowledge North and West Africans' 
combat prowess, but that hardly meant that the French held their African 
subjects on an equal footing -- quite the contrary, in fact. As Adriane 
Lenty-Smith writes in her book Freedom Struggles, the French were just as 
racist as their American counterparts; they simply went about it in a 
different way.15 
 French employment of African troops rested on military necessity, 
not egalitarian principle. Eventually, over 140,000 West African men 
served on the Western Front by war's end. In the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, France worriedly watched as its population declined while 
Germany's population surged, thus giving the Germans a definite 
manpower advantage should any war erupt between the two powers. When 
the war finally set Europe aflame, the French Army desperately needed 
troops by the winter of 1914. Out of an army of 2 million men, over 
500,000 had fallen to German guns by New Year's Eve. Faced with such 
dire military exigencies, the French increasingly relied on colonial 
conscripts to help augment their ravaged armies. Nevertheless, as historian 
Joe H. Lunn writes, "cette migration temporaire mis enforcée" (this forced, 
temporary migration) to metropolitan France was both unprecedented and 
temporary, for not only was the French use of black troops a military 
necessity, but it was also justified by racial prejudices, some different, but 
                                                            
15 Emmett J. Scott, Scott's Official History of the American Negro in the World War (New York: 
Arno Press, 1919), 117; Harris, Harlem's Hellfighters, 180; Adriane Lenty-Smith, Freedom 
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others all too familiar to many African-American troops fighting by their 
side.16 
 While the Americans debased African-American troops' fighting 
abilities based upon misguided perceptions of racial inferiority, the French 
actually used these perceptions to validate their argument in favor of using 
colonial soldiers. As has already been established, US Army officers 
believed that racial primitiveness made black troops unfit for combat, but 
in General Charles Mangin's 1911 treatise entitled La Bête Noire, the general 
argued that West Africans' primitively developed nervous system enabled 
them to be the perfect warriors; the idea being that stunted brains made 
Africans impervious to pain. Nevertheless, Mangin's ideas still unsettled 
many in the French military establishment, especially those who had 
commanded African colonial troops abroad.  One such general, Charles 
Moinier, reflected many a French and American sentiment when he voiced 
his belief that Africans lacked the ability to adapt to modern warfare due 
to their allegedly backwards ways and delayed development. Others, like 
the former Madagascar forces commander General Louis de Forcy, 
declared that Africans exhibited poor marksmanship, discipline, and were 
too excitable to be effectively controlled, all of which echoed the countless 
American voices opposing the formation of African-American combat 
units in the United States. In the end, though, these racist reservations were 
shunted aside in order to address the French Army's dire manpower crisis. 
Even so, the spirit of égalité hardly penetrated the hearts of the French rank 
and file.17  
 Stateside, the role played by West African soldiers on the Western 
Front was hardly lost upon the African-American press. Many black 
newspapers trumpeted the heroism of black West Africans as news from 
the front flew across the Atlantic in the years before the US entry into the 
war, holding such exploits aloft as evidence of Jim Crow's bold-faced lies.  
However, historian Chad L. Williams notes how the propagandistic 
impulses of the time drove many African-American papers to idealize the 
French Army, thus blinding them to the actual racial landscape in France. 
In his work Torchbearers of Democracy, Williams maintains that this 
romanticism obscured the fact that French racial policy toward its African 
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subjects was nothing more than another means of justification for white 
supremacy that proved as insidious as Jim Crow. Williams writes how the 
French colonial aim was to "impart French culture onto Africans to 
convert them from savage ways." Williams reinforces his claim by linking 
this to Africans' wartime service.  With the presence of so many North and 
West African troops, this allowed for the ultimate assimilation by 
"breeding a spirit of loyalty and civic obligation" to France. Colonel 
Edouard Réquin's reply to War Department Special Assistant Emmett 
Scott's wartime letter regarding the French desire for African-American 
troops illustrates this concept in luminous detail. Ensconced in a heap of 
praise for French colonial troops, Réquin, who served as the French 
military liaison in Washington, gushed to Scott of the racial harmony that 
had come about as a result of the war. Nevertheless, a close reading is not 
required to see the lop-sided nature of Réquin's praise.  He proclaims that 
"just as we have delivered these black men from African barbarism, so we 
have given them civilization and justice." Once more, racism twisted what 
outsiders might have construed as a more egalitarian drive predicated on 
inclusion when the opposite actually held true. In reality, "the French 
authorities were in fact much more concerned about preserving the status 
of their white personnel," and therefore adopted many policies that would 
have led many African-American soldiers to believe that no national 
boundary or frontier could contain racism's ravenous rage.18 
 In late 1917 and throughout 1918, the 93rd Division thought that 
they had caught a glimpse of the promised land on French battlefields. 
While they filed passed French officers, little did they realize that these 
veterans of the slaughtering fields of Verdun and Champagne possessed 
little faith in African-American officers' abilities. Specifically, they held 
severe doubts concerning African-American officers' technical expertise 
and training. These doubts reached back to a prevailing feeling that 
permeated the French officer corps during the war and presented itself in 
a policy that directly mirrored US Army directives regarding African-
American officers. Similar to African-Americans, African soldiers could 
acquire an officer's commission in the French Army, albeit climbing the 
ranks was a different matter. Just as the Personnel and Re-Organization Plan 
sought to shackle African-American officers to lower grades, so too did 
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French prejudices obstruct many aspiring African officers. Officiers indigènes, 
African officers, were incapable of wielding command authority over white 
troops, or so went the French military's established doctrine. A pervasive 
fear of non-white officers outranking white officers, which many believed 
would send the French racial hierarchy into a tailspin, led to the unwritten 
rule that if two officers, one white and the other non-white, came up for 
the same promotion, the white officer was virtually assured that promotion 
based solely on his race. As Richard Fogarty notes, this "prevented any 
true sense of respect or equality from developing." This connected to the 
greater French belief that native West Africans' primitiveness and 
uneducated status made them incapable of aspiring to, let alone entering, 
something as high-minded as the officer corps. This belief hardly limited 
itself to officers either.19     
 According to prevailing French attitudes, West Africans' war-like 
animalism and low regard for life, especially their own, tailor-made them 
for combat. In fact, German soldiers reportedly feared West African 
troops above all others prior to the American entry into the war. Favoring 
bayonet attacks and night raids, French West African troops' reputed 
savagery in battle froze the Germans' hearts in their chests, something the 
French government exploited to their own propagandistic advantage. 
Despite this, they enforced a strict segregationist policy, requiring West 
African troops to train in isolated training centers removed from French 
civilians, usually in the Midi or Gironde regions of southern France. 
Furthermore, like so many American voices, even Pershing's, French army 
manuals stipulated that African troops were only effective when led by 
white European officers. If these officers fell in battle, then the resulting 
cohesion loss would cascade into the unit's complete breakdown. 
Therefore, French military doctrine proclaimed in a document entitled 
"Notice sur les Sénégalais et leur emploi au combat" (Notice on the 
Senegalese and their use in combat) that a white French unit must be 
stationed immediately to the rear of an African battalion during an attack 
so as to "sustain them." The stipulations decreed in the "Notice" combined 
with the aforementioned French racist beliefs produced within the French 
Army the established formula for how to effectively use African soldiers: 
shock troops. Just as American racism attempted to relegate African-
American troops to menial labor duties, in France, this same racism 
compelled French generals to hurl whole battalions of North and West 
African soldiers into the very maw of German machine guns. This 
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phenomenon begets the question then as to why African-American troops 
serving with the French felt so liberated in their new surroundings. The 
answer proves to be paradoxically baffling and enlightening.20  
 In his response to Special Assistant Scott, Colonel Réquin 
concludes his evaluation of French colonial soldiers with a marked contrast 
with the soon-to-arrive African-American forces en route to France that 
raises the brow of the discerning eye. After explaining that, despite their 
combat skills, African troops were devoid of any hint of civilization, the 
French colonel finishes by assuring Scott that these soldiers are "men who 
cannot be compared from this point of view with colored Americans." 
Herein lay the dramatic divide in not only French and US racial 
perceptions, but also between West African and African-American troops' 
experiences among Frenchmen during the First World War. "Les 
Américains Noirs", or "the black Americans," as black US troops were 
sometimes called, were seen by the French in a vastly different light than 
French colonial Africans, and geography proved to be the key element in 
their reasoning. Algerians, Moroccans, and Senegalese hailed from Africa, 
a land Frenchmen had understood to be a savage and primitive continent. 
In fact, most Frenchmen had never seen a black man, as evidenced by their 
repeated action of rubbing black soldiers' skin to see if its dark color would 
rub off. Nevertheless, the image of the savage and uncivilized African 
stood foremost in Frenchmen’s' minds. As one West African ruefully 
recalled, "the French thought we were cannibals, [even though] we never 
ate anybody." However, African-Americans were, first and foremost, 
Americans. According to French perspectives, the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade that spirited so many across a vast ocean and condemned so many 
to a lifetime of bondage in America actually spared African-Americans the 
"uncivilizing" stigma of being African. Because their ancestors were 
removed from Africa and had been acculturated to American/Western 
ways for several centuries, African-Americans stood a step above Africans 
in the French cultural and racial order. In a twist of irony, the main reason 
for African-Americans' marginalization in American society proved to be 
the main reason for their relative acceptance in French society. This same 
irony even seeps into African-Americans' view of West Africans, thus 
leading one to some surprising revelations.21 
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 There does exist one final note on this point that merits mention, 
and that is African-American soldiers' perceptions of the West Africans 
with whom they served. Ironically, many black US troops thought along 
the same lines as the French, especially when it came to the concept of 
African savagery. Although many black US veterans remembered French 
colonials as fierce and effective fighters, many believed that West African 
troops fashioned war trophies from the remains of slain Germans. One 
popular rumor that passed from one man to another was the West African 
"practice" of fashioning human ear necklaces, and that West Africans were 
ruthlessly bloodthirsty and culturally backwards. One aspect that 
exaggerated this belief lay in the language barrier between the two. Most 
colonial Africans spoke no French, or at best a pidgin French forced on 
them by Frenchmen, and no English. By contrast, the men of the 93rd US 
Division stood in high esteem, since "The French folk like the colored 
boys, and felt highly honored at the way the latter learned French," 
declared the Chicago-based newspaper The Broad Ax.  Furthermore, they 
could not fathom a person not being able to speak English. As one 93rd 
doughboy so eloquently put it, he could not understand how a man could 
not "speak United States." Such similarity in perceptions between African-
Americans and French make for a damaging case against US racist beliefs, 
since black US troops were so American, there existed an immense cultural 
and linguistic chasm separating them from their racial cousins. 
Nevertheless, both shared a common history of marginalization in their 
respective societies, and in spite of all this, both groups, especially the 
untried regiments of the 93rd Division, acquitted themselves well in 
combat; some might even say they covered themselves in glory.22  
 As the reader has already gleaned, the doughboys of the 92nd and 
93rd Divisions battled hard against discrimination, and as the war reached 
a crescendo in the summer and fall of 1918, these African-American 
soldiers engaged both racism and the Germans in deadly combat. In order 
to gain as complete a view as possible of their combat trials and 
tribulations, one must take stock of the battles endured by both divisions. 
 In the American Expeditionary Force's combat chronicles, the 
"Buffalo Soldiers" of the 92nd Division bear the tarnished reputation of 
being total failures. The reasons stem from the Meuse-Argonne Campaign 
from September 25-30, 1918, a campaign which greatly taxed the extremely 
green and untested AEF in its entirety. Assigned to be the lynchpin 
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between the US 77th Division and the French Fourth Army, elements of 
the 92nd undertook a mission fraught with disaster before it ever began. 
Devoid of adequate maps, communications, artillery support, and 
constantly harassed by German fire, the Buffalo Soldiers conducted a 
series of confusing and sometimes disastrous retreats and advances that 
saw some of their number break. Numerous white officers in the US Army 
cited the 92nd's troublesome performance as evidence of their inferiority 
as combat troops and as a validation of their long-held racist views. As 
always, the truth proved more complicated.23  
 With many white officers at the helm of the 92nd's battalions, it 
goes without saying that the supply and liaison issues, the poor 
communications, the lack of wire cutters to cut through the German 
barbed wire, all of these mistakes fall on their shoulders. One unit that 
nearly collapsed during the attack, the 2nd Battalion, 368th Infantry, 
highlights this perfect storm. Its white commanding officer, Major Max 
Elser, a lawyer by trade, failed to establish contact with his companies, 
moved his command post, from which he was always absent, without 
notifying his subordinates, did not know where his men were located, and 
even got lost during the course of the action. All the while, he gave 
contradictory orders that caused some companies to advance and others 
to retreat. It is worth noting that Major Elser's command became so 
disoriented from confusion and German fire that a superior removed 
Major Elser from command on the spot after he suffered a nervous 
breakdown at the front. The 2/368th's chaotic combat cacophony stands 
in stark contrast to the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, which managed to 
achieve its objective.24  
 A career white officer with plenty of experience commanding large 
bodies of men, Major John N. Merril encountered the same problems as 
the other luckless battalions in the 92nd Division. Still, by a combination 
of military know-how and force of will, he pushed his men to victory. After 
coercively acquiring adequate wire cutters for the job, Major Merril 
maintained personal control over his unit, and unlike Major Elser, actually 
led from the front. Organizing his men into cohesive formations and 
effectively reconnoitering the battlefield, Major Merril and the 1st 
Battalion not only withstood German shells, but pushed the enemy out of 
the village of Binarville, which the French had originally intended to seize. 
Still, Major Merril's coup hardly dampened the flaring racist flames. 
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Historian Robert Ferrell writes that the AEF command used the Argonne 
battle "as a rationale that black troops require white officers," when, in 
reality, "the basic problem of command was the incompetence of white 
officers" like Major Elser. Even more damning were the lasting effects this 
battle would have after the war. Even though only one regiment out of the 
entire division, the 368th, engaged in combat, the US military brass 
enshrined this as the failure of the entire experiment of employing black 
troops in battle. Conveniently, the Army dismissed the all-white 35th 
Division's similar performance in the Argonne as a matter of poor supply 
and liaison, thus preserving white supremacy's façade.  As a result, no all 
African-American divisions would be formed in the future until the Army 
relented in 1944 with the re-constitution of the 92nd Division in World 
War II. While the 92nd bore the undeserved stain of defeat, the 93rd's 
regiments' battlefield actions would coat them in a wall of Croix de Guerre 
and Distinguished Service Crosses.25 
 In a complete about face to his own beliefs, war correspondent 
Irvin Cobb marveled at how well the 93rd's men adjusted to the war's 
rigors. In fact, Cobb and his cohorts did not initially believe that African-
Americans had really engaged the Germans, since "we had grown 
accustomed to thinking of our negroes as members of labor battalions 
working along lines of communication." Cobb even addressed the notion 
that black troops broke under combat's strain when he wrote that if that 
were to be the truth, then "the representatives of the dark races that come 
from America are the exceptions to the rule." Through their own trials at 
the front, the 93rd proved to be just as fierce as any competent unit in any 
competent army.26  
 There is perhaps no greater illustration of racism's fallacies in 
World War I than the outstanding performance of the 93rd Infantry 
Division on the Western Front. All four of the African-American 
regiments received the regimental French Croix de Guerre, as well as a 
total of 365 individual Croix de Guerre. Perhaps the most famous example 
lies in the account of Private Henry O. Johnson. Manning an observation 
post with another soldier, the men came under fierce German fire. Using 
only the ammunition and grenades at hand, as well as a bolo knife, Pvt. 
Johnson managed to defend his wounded comrade while engaging the 
Germans in a brutal fight, even though Pvt. Johnson's own laconic 
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recollections do not always conjure up images of the battle's ferocity: "I 
was still banging them when my crowd came up and saved me and beat 
the Germans off.  That fight lasted about an hour.  That's about all.  There 
wasn't so much to it."  While Pvt. Johnson considered such actions as just 
another day at the front, the French bestowed upon him the Croix de 
Guerre with Gold Palm, thus making him the first US soldier of any skin 
color to receive that honor in World War I. In another sector, Pvt. Bruce 
Wright's 372nd Regiment once held off a Prussian Guards unit for five 
days before counter-attacking across a river to seize the town of Monthois. 
The regiment drew special attention in a citation penned by the French 
Fourth Army commander, General Gaylet, who hailed the "irresistible and 
heroic rush of the colored American regiments," and that "The most 
formidable defenses, the strongest machine gun nests, the most crushing 
artillery barrages were unable to stop them." In the face of such tenacity, 
German troops dubbed the African-American soldiers "hell-fighters," or 
"Black devils." Even though the Germans did not believe African-
Americans to be as ruthless as West Africans, they feared them 
nonetheless, describing them as "more scientific and more dangerous 
fighters" because they fought with "precision, fought like veterans." These 
actions can only illustrate the bravery exhibited by the 93rd's soldiers, for 
they hardly do justice to the numerous accounts of valor referenced by 
American and French officers, and even their German foes. Contrary to 
the popular beliefs of the time, African-Americans fought just as hard and 
just as well, sometimes better, than white soldiers.27  
 In conclusion, the First World War reflected race and racism's 
profound role and impact in early 20th-century America and France. In a 
sense, both countries' experiences in the war reflected how much had and 
had not changed, as both establishments sought to preserve their own 
particular version of racial hierarchy amidst the violent winds of change 
wrought by World War I. Just as the war shattered Europe's empires, so 
too did it challenge the very racial conceptions conservative orders in 
America and Europe sought to uphold, thus laying the foundation for even 
greater tumult and transformation in the mid-20th century. Nevertheless, 
for the African-American soldiers who bore the unique distinction of 
marching under two flags, the war not only revealed the fighting prowess, 
endurance, and determination of a people fighting a two-front war for the 
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eradication of tyranny abroad and at home. It also reflected the underlying 
racial conceptions in France that shaped African-Americans' experiences 
abroad, as well as revealing the reality of early 20th-century French race 
perceptions. Still, nearly one hundred years later, with their deeds carved 
in history's stone tablets, the African-American men of the First World 
War now stand abreast of their ancestors in the pantheon of black soldiers 
who proudly donned their country's uniform from Union blue to olive 
drab. 
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